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Technology and International Trade:
 Will the Real Transformer Please Stand Up?1
Todd Weiler†
most challenging of contests between individuals or
between individuals and regulators (the less challenging
he primary driver of change in Canada’s cultural are most often settled or otherwise resolved). The legalT sector has not been some kind of contrived, neo- resolution of these disputes may bring about a change in
liberal plot imposed upon an unsuspecting public with the legal order or they may arise as a result of a change in
the promise of ‘‘jobs, jobs, jobs.’’ Rather, it has been the legal order. In either case, they are likely reflective of
technology. The role for liberalised trade and investment a past or impending change in society. In other words,
treaties comes only in the form of a conditioning force, there is a reason for the dispute — something has effec-
limiting the panoply of choices available to govern- tively changed the status quo ante between the parties,
mental officials who want to respond to the changes permitting (or forcing) them to seek a legal resolution to
being wrought by technological advances. their dispute. Thus, the study of legal disputes permits
This paper begins with some brief definitions, one to make observations concerning the nature and
moving next to an elaboration of its thesis, and finally extent of legal transformation.
explaining the application of this thesis to some selected Treaty regimes such as the North American Free
case studies. Trade Agreement (NAFTA)3 act as an external condi-
‘‘Transformation’’ is defined as ‘‘a marked change, as tioning force on the way governments regulate. Contrary
in appearance or character, usually for the better.’’ 2 Legal to the beliefs of some ardent anti-globalization protes-
transformation is the phenomenon of change or dis- tors, treaty regimes do not represent a ‘‘surrender of sov-
placement in the established legal order, often in ereignty’’; rather, they represent the exercise of sover-
response to external stimuli that challenge the under- eignty, whereby democratic governments determine that
lying policy assumptions upon which that order was it would be in the best interest of their citizens to choose
built. Policy is the discourse which takes place among to refrain from acting in ways that are deleterious to the
governing elites concerning the nature or utility of soci- well-being of a greater number of people. In other words,
etal changes. Oftentimes, the policy discourse includes a through trade and investment treaties, governments have
discussion or alternative means to address the perceived agreed to save each other from the prisoner’s dilemma of
changes in the ideal social order. These policy choices are discriminatory and arbitrary regulatory conduct, which
implemented in order to ‘‘fix’’ the perceived problem by — while appealing to a local constituency — has led to
changing behaviour to suit the objectives and goals such social and economic catastrophes as the Great
chosen beforehand by these elites. Depression and numerous wars.
The legal regime exists in order to condition or To the extent that international obligations con-
modify behaviour, individually or collectively. The legal strain (or sometimes compel) regulatory behaviour
regime changes only through the purposive policy which would not have occurred but for their existence,
choices of governing elites. It cannot be transformed they can be said to have a transformative effect on
through osmosis. By contrast, societal change often domestic legal regimes. More often than not, however,
occurs through a process akin to osmosis, although it can governments take reservations in treaties to safeguard
also be brought about by external forces, including the their most sensitive political interests — thus leaving the
imposition of, or change in, a legal regime; or through remainder of their local regulatory regimes to the disci-
some other form of external stimuli, such as technolog- plines of a new, external regime. And for the most part,
ical change. none of those regimes violate the basic tenets of interna-
Legal disputes are an excellent vantage point from tional economic law, such as national treatment4 (i.e.,
which to witness transformation (both in society and in promising to treat the foreigner as well as the local);
the governing legal regime). Legal disputes represent the most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment5 (i.e., promising
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224 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
(b) the production, distribution, sale or exhibition ofto treat the foreigner as well as other foreigners); fair and
film or video recordings;equitable treatment6 (i.e., promising transparency and
due process in governmental decision-making); and the (c) the production, distribution, sale or exhibition of
audio or video music recordings;promise to pay prompt and appropriate compensation
for the taking of property. 7 (d) the publication, distribution or sale of music in
print or machine readable form; orWith the NAFTA, Canada sought, and obtained,
special treatment for its regulation of cultural industries. (e) radiocommunications in which the transmissions
are intended for direct reception by the generalIt did not obtain a complete reservation for the sector for
public, and all radio, television and cable broad-two reasons. First, officials recognised the value of
casting undertakings and all satellite programmingexternal constraints and the economic well-being they and broadcast network services[.]
bring. Second, the price for complete impunity for the
regulation of an indeterminate group of industries A more careful review at the second paragraph of
would have been too high, requiring Canada to liberalize CUSFTA Article 2005 reveals, however, that cultural
in many other sensitive political areas for the expense of industries were really not exempted from the NAFTA at
a handful of Canadian-owned cultural industry mem- all. Rather than being a cultural reservation or exemp-
bers. Accordingly, the NAFTA Parties agreed to grant to tion, NAFTA Article 2106 and Annex 2106 represent a
Canada the same ‘‘cultural industry exemption’’ that it cultural retaliation clause. Canada is free to regulate cul-
had obtained in the Canada–U.S. Free Trade Agreement. tural industries as it sees fit, but if such regulation harms
As NAFTA Annex 2106 states: U.S. or Mexican trade or investment interests, retaliation
is permitted under the NAFTA. While some governmentNotwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement, as
officials appear to have believed such retaliation wouldbetween Canada and the United States, any measure
adopted or maintained with respect to cultural industries, only be imposed after the establishment and conclusion
except as specifically provided in Article 302 (Market Access of a NAFTA Chapter 20 dispute settlement panel, the
— Tariff Elimination), and any measure of equivalent com- truth is that the provision contemplates retaliation as amercial effect taken in response, shall be governed under
first response. If Canada does not believe the retaliationthis Agreement exclusively in accordance with the provi-
sions of the Canada–United States Free Trade Agreement. was warranted on the basis that it was not taken in
The rights and obligations between Canada and any other response to the regulation of a cultural industry, or if
Party with respect to such measures shall be identical to Canada believes the quantum of the retaliatory measure
those applying between Canada and the United States. exceeds what would be the ‘‘equivalent commercial
Article 2005 of the Canada–U.S. Free Trade Agree- effect’’ of its cultural measure, Canada will be forced to
ment (CUSFTA)8, in turn, provides: take the matter to a Chapter 20 panel.
(1) Cultural industries are exempt from the provisions Of course, one could note that since CUSFTAof this Agreement, except as specifically provided in Article
Article 2005 and NAFTA Article 2106 were both drafted401 (Tariff Elimination), paragraph 4 of Article 1607 (divesti-
before the advent of the World Wide Web, there appearsture of an indirect acquisition) and Articles 2006 and 2007
of this Chapter. to be a yawning gap in the definition of ‘‘cultural indus-
tries.’’ The gap would appear to include such applica-(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agree-
ment, a Party may take measures of equivalent commercial tions as video streaming and television ‘‘broadcasts’’ over
effect in response to actions which would have been incon- IP. In such cases, the regulation of these activities could
sistent with this Agreement but for paragraph 1. be reviewed under any applicable NAFTA services,
Accordingly, apart from specific provisions con- investment or intellectual property provision. The result
tained within CUSFTA Article 2206 concerning retrans- of a finding of non-compliance, as a practical matter,
mission rights in the cable (and now also satellite) televi- would be the potential for economic retaliation,
sion businesses, some people in Canada believed that it although it is at least arguable that the demonstration of
had taken what appears to have been a very broad reser- a breach of an international law obligation is more likely
vation for its regulation of cultural industries — pro- than not to result in a change in government policy in
viding it with carte blanche to exclude foreigners from order to conform to the obligation.
making cultural investments, providing cultural services,
The other significant reason that it matters whetheror producing cultural goods. In order to understand how
the cultural retaliation clause applies to the regulation ofbroad the reservation first appeared to be, one need only
an alleged cultural industry is the existence of Part B oflook to the NAFTA Article 2107 definition of ‘‘cultural
NAFTA Chapter 11. This portion of the NAFTA permitsindustries’’:
an investor from another NAFTA Party to seek damages
cultural industries means persons engaged in any of the before an international arbitral tribunal for non-compli-following activities: ance with a number of basic trade norms. Awards ren-
(a) the publication, distribution, or sale of books, dered by these tribunals are enforceable against the
magazines, periodicals or newspapers in print or NAFTA Parties using the mechanisms in place in eachmachine readable form but not including the sole
country for the enforcement of any commercial arbitralactivity of printing or typesetting any of the fore-





























































Technology and International Trade 225
the cultural exemption would arguably not be subject to services (with encryption technologies12) and dramati-
a claim for compensation, everything else would be fair cally dropping the price of music sold on compact
game. disks13, while launching waves of law suits against file-
sharing companies and those who use them in a mannerIn addition to the NAFTA, there are also the World
that arguably violates the artists’ copyright in theirTrade Organization (WTO) Agreements, 9 which contain
recordings (as protected in the licenses that implicitlysimilar kinds of obligations to the NAFTA, but which
govern the use of any recording sold to a consumer,may go further than either the NAFTA or its CUSFTA
regardless of format).predecessor would otherwise prohibit. For example, the
WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)10 When the legal regime is forced to change, the time
contains an MFN treatment obligation that covers all of the international trade regime is nigh. In short, inter-
trade in services, subject to specified exemptions. Accord- national economic rules come into play when domestic
ingly, if the Canadian Government adopts a policy that legal regimes change, conditioning the policy choices
could be construed as favouring other nationals in a new available to respond to these new tensions. They require
way that was not ‘‘grandfathered’’ through a reservation, the new measures to be imposed in a transparent and
claims could be launched by other governments against procedurally fair manner (e.g., NAFTA Article 1105 or
Canada for a breach of the GATS MFN obligation Article X of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(Article II). — the ‘‘GATT’’ 14). They require the new measures to not
result in better treatment to one foreigner, or oneGiven the nature of the NAFTA cultural retaliation
domestic economic operator, than other foreigners (e.g.,clause, the numerous cultural reservations taken by
NAFTA Articles 1102 and 1103 or GATS Article 11).Canada in most international treaties, and the basic char-
They require that the result of the measure cannot beacter of Canada’s WTO and NAFTA obligations, it is
the effective confiscation of a foreigner’s investment innonetheless fair to say that Canada’s legal regime gov-
Canada (NAFTA Article 1110). Aside from these rules,erning cultural industries — as it stood on the day the
governments can respond to technological change in anyNAFTA and WTO Agreements came into force — has
way they see fit. As it often turns out, however, the(and will be) unaffected by the existence of the NAFTA
Government of Canada has not demonstrated a particu-and the WTO.
larly good record of compliance with international obli-That is not the end of the story, however, for there gations.have been more than a handful of disputes involving
Canada’s regulation of cultural industries over the past
ten years which have resulted in changes to the existing
legal regime. The two cases which will be examined in
Split-Run Magazines this paper are: (1) the ‘‘split run’’ magazine dispute; and
(2) the Amazon.ca dispute. Both cases provide an excel-
plit-run magazine publishing is a common publica-lent example of how the primary driver of legal transfor- S tion method in the United States. In a nutshell, themation in the cultural sector has been technology, rather
magazine publisher produces magazines for eachthan the conditioning of international trade regimes.
regional market, with a majority of the content shared
Technological advances lead to changes in human and one-tenth to one-quarter directed to different mar-
behaviour, including business models. As the owners of kets. Split run publishing allows Sports Illustrated, for
video tape rental stores are learning, the advent — and example, to publish a national magazine that appeals to
consumer acceptance of — video-on-demand has forced Dodger and Lakers fans in Southern California, as well as
them to modify or abandon their existing business Yankee and Rangers fans in metropolitan New York.
models. The same is true of ‘‘record stores’’ (referring to a The problem for the Canadian government was that
format of recording music that has essentially gone the Sports Illustrated could also publish an edition for
way of the dinosaur). Record stores and record compa- Canada for very little added costs, potentially skimming
nies are struggling to come to terms with file-swapping off revenues from Canadian magazine publishers who
services that threaten their business model11 by diversi- could not take advantage of such economies of scale
fying product offerings and markedly changing sales and because Americans would not be interested in their
distribution models. They have also resorted to legal magazines. Accordingly, they would be forced to com-
disputes against file-sharing services and consumers. pete with (what was assumed) to a be limited pool of
As stated above, sometimes technology-driven advertising dollars with an internationally branded
changes disrupt the status quo ante upon which the ‘‘American’’ magazine whose production costs were lim-
existing legal regime is based. When this phenomenon ited to the hiring of one or two Canadian reporters and
occurs, one can expect to see recourse to legal disputes the contracting-out of actual publication and distribu-
by those whose interests have been, are being, and/or tion. To some, this practice represents a form of ‘‘cultural
will be affected by technological change. No better dumping’’ (analogizing to trade laws that prohibit the
example exists today than the one-two step of music ‘‘dumping’’ of goods in a foreign market at a price lower





























































226 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
The Canadian Government has had a long-standing dized postage). Bill C-55 was completely flawed for three
policy against the publication of American split-run reasons. First, it would most likely have been found to be
magazines for the English-Canadian market. While an unnecessary abridgement to the constitutionally pro-
Canada was forced to repeal its laws banning foreign tected right of free speech. Second, it would likely have
production of newspapers in Article 2007 of the simply driven advertisers to direct their money to
CUSFTA, it did not bargain away its split-run policy Internet-based magazines (which were not covered by
when negotiating the NAFTA, and for a few years, the the measure); and third, the U.S. was not obliged to go
U.S. did not retaliate (most likely because no U.S. firm back to the WTO in order to challenge Canada’s trans-
complained enough about basically being barred from parent attempt to circumvent its GATT obligations
the Canadian market). Three U.S.-owned periodicals (which would undoubtedly have been found to affect
(most notably Time Canada) had been permitted to trade in goods — i.e., magazines — and thus would have
operate in Canada because they were already in business violated GATT Article III:4 anyway).
by the time Canada began to effectively enforce its anti- Rather than waste any more time in Geneva pur-
U.S.-split-run policy. It is important to note that none of suing WTO remedies, the U.S. merely drafted a list of
Canada’s measures prevented U.S.-origin magazines goods to which it would soon apply punishing duties.
without a Canadian-split-run edition from entering the The retaliation would be specifically targeted at goods
market. Accordingly as much as 80% of English Cana- produced in the home town of the Cabinet Minister
dian newsstands were occupied by U.S.-origin responsible for Bill C-55, Sheila Copps. Whereas some
magazines. Canada’s policy was aimed at protecting the Canadian officials naively thought that NAFTA
remaining 20%, and the domestic advertising revenues Article 2105 would only be invoked by the United States
that flowed from it (U.S.-origin magazines would obvi- to receive permission from a trade panel to retaliate
ously contain mostly U.S.-origin advertising, thus not (which would have taken even longer than another trip
affecting the Canadian publisher’s share of local reve- to the WTO), the truth was that the NAFTA required no
nues). such thing. It merely stated that measures of equivalent
commercial effect could be imposed in cases where aCanada enforced its split-run policy through three
Canadian measure was justified under the culturalmeasures: a prohibitive 80% excise tax on the import of
industries exemption. Accordingly, it would be up tosplit-run magazines; a subsidy granted to Canadian pub-
Canada to prove: (1) that the retaliation was unjustifiedlishers to reduce postage costs; and an income tax deduc-
because Bill C-55 was not really a cultural measure; ortion for advertising in Canadian magazines. In particular,
that (2) the amount of the retaliation was simply toothe 80% excise tax was calculated to prevent Sports Illus-
high. In the mean time, Madame Copps would have hadtrated from entering the Canadian market in 1993. By
to run for re-election in a city potentially devastated as a1997, the United States was acting on the problem —
direct result of her own actions.and it chose the WTO General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade to challenge these measures. It succeeded in The solution negotiated with the United States per-
having the first two measures found in violation of mitted any U.S. firm to publish split-runs in Canada,
Canada’s obligation to provide national treatment to subject to an agreement to provide a minimum level of
magazine publishers under GATT Article III:4, and Canadian content which most would arguably have
Canada was forced to respond. ended up delivering anyway. In the years that have
passed since the settlement, the magazine publishingAt the same time, however, the Canadian Govern-
landscape has not dramatically changed in terms of thement faced an additional problem: the excise tax could
production of hard copies, although the content-pro-be completely circumvented by electronically transfer-
vider industry has changed dramatically with the adventring the contents of a magazine to a sub-contracted
of more and more sophisticated IP-based deliveryCanadian publishing facility — because no magazines
methods.would be imported! Faced with the obligation to adopt
new measures that were GATT-consistent, and knowl-
edgeable of how advances in technology rendered
border measures useless, Canadian officials drafted
Amazon.com Bill C-55, a measure that simply prohibited Canadians
from advertising in U.S. split-run magazines. 15 afely reserved from both the NAFTA and the GATS,
The idea behind Bill C-55 was that since it was S has been the long-standing Canadian cultural policy
strictly targeted at advertising services — something that that those who publish, distribute, or sell books in
Canada had never promised in the NAFTA or any WTO Canada must be Canadian individuals or firms owned
Agreement to honour the national treatment standard and controlled by Canadians. This policy is based on the
— the measure would protect Canadian publishers as presumption that a foreign (read: U.S.) book publisher or
effectively as had the border measures and postal subsidy retailer would not be interested in selling books by
(which could be easily reworked to comply with WTO Canadian authors to Canadians. This policy has been





























































Technology and International Trade 227
get their work published in what would otherwise be ican courts have sometimes interpreted U.S. constitu-
what some have called the ‘‘MacWorld.’’ For all of the tional law in such a way as to assert personal jurisdiction
many Canadian authors who have been nominated for, over Internet-based retailers directing their business
or awarded, the world’s most prestigious awards (such as model towards customers in the territorial jurisdiction in
the Booker), or who have appeared on the ultimate ‘‘best question, Canada has no similar constitutional jurispru-
seller list’’ (maintained by the New York Times) it must dence upon which to draw.
seem somewhat galling that Canadian policy-makers
Canadian book publishers, distributors and retailershave long believed that the millions of people around
have basically enjoyed decades of protection from thethe world who read their work would not have done so
forces of competition that were unleashed by theif Canadians did not run the publishing houses and
NAFTA and WTO Agreements, and which overhauledretail stores from which their books are sought.
so many of Canada’s once-archaic and inefficient indus-
Nonetheless, it must be stressed that under the tries. All of a sudden, technological change has permitted
NAFTA and WTO, Canada was under no obligation to their erstwhile competitors to enter the market, and
alter this policy. Those who would fault international Canada cannot simply impose new measures upon them
treaties for the fact that Canadians can today purchase to halt the process. Otherwise, we would witness a repeat
their books by going to www.amazon.ca would be sadly of the split-run magazine story, as Canada has com-
mistaken. The reason why www.amazon.ca exists is mitted to make no new changes to its cultural regimes in
because the proprietors of www.amazon.com realized the NAFTA and WTO Agreements. The reservations it
that a large number of Canadians demonstrated an negotiated with other trading partners effectively
interest in purchasing books from them, most likely ‘‘grandfathered’’ these measures — but only in the form
because of their business model — which provides more in which they appeared as of the date these treaties came
people with more — and generally less-expensive — into force (both in the mid-1990’s).
access to the books they want to read than any indi-
Partially because Canada’s legislation had not con-vidual book store (including those run by chains, which
templated the kind of B2B e-commerce that permittednaturally will tend to stock only the most popular titles,
Sports Illustrated to avoid the existing regime, andleaving those in search of more obscure publications to
because Canada’s legislation had not contemplated thewait for their ‘‘special order’’ to arrive.
kind of B2C e-commerce pioneered by companies such
The Amazon.ca business model is simple. Orders as Amazon, these regimes were left open to the trans-
are placed on the .ca site, which is maintained on web forming effects of technological change. Fresh from its
servers in the United States. The orders are handled in failed experiment with modifying its split-run measures
extensively the same way that they would be handled if to maintain its split-run policy, the Canadian Govern-
they had been made through the .com address. Fulfil- ment did not attempt to block Amazon.ca. Any attempt
ment of the orders has been contracted-out to a Cana- to do so would have been open to challenge under the
dian-owned logistical company, with warehouses in services and investment chapters of the NAFTA (particu-
Canada, and to Canada Post, a crown corporation with a larly the former, but possibly the latter, given the much
statutory monopoly to deliver mail, which is owned by broader definition of ‘‘investment’’ found in Article 1139
the Government of Canada itself. (That Canada Post has than could be found in Canada’s investment review
abused its monopoly position to compete unfairly in the measures).
business of expedited parcel delivery is the subject of an
A legal dispute has nonetheless arisen, however,unrelated NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitration launched by
which permits us to consider just how technologicalUPS.) The relevant question for Amazon.ca is the legal
change has effectively led to legal transformation. Theregime that governs the publication, distribution and
heretofore protected giant of Canadian book retailing,sale of books in Canada.
Indigo Books, along with an association of booksellers
It is apparent that Amazon.ca has found a perfect normally at odds with it, have banded together in an
way of structuring its business model so as to avoid any attempt to force the Department of Canadian heritage to
contravention of Canada’s investment regime (which do what it arguably cannot do under international trade
basically prohibits non-Canadian ownership unless the rules: keep Amazon.ca out of Canada. Such a result,
Minister concludes that it is in the best interests of albeit unlikely (given the high standard of deference
Canada to permit it). Amazon.ca does not publish books shown to the discretion of government officials in Cana-
anywhere. It does not distribute them in Canada; that dian administrative law), would undoubtedly enforce
work was contracted out to two Canadian-owned busi- the spirit and goals of the existing regime. Accordingly,
nesses. It does not sell the books in Canada because — as whether these protected companies score an unexpected
far as the Government of Canada is concerned — it does upset and compel Canada to violate its international
not have any investment in Canada — at all. It has no treaty commitments, or whether they lose, technology
subsidiary in Canada. It has no employees in Canada. It has had a transformative effect on the old legal regime —
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and deregulation equal, if not superior, to the externalConclusion 
legal force of international treaties, with all of their
ith this short paper, I have attempted to demon- exceptions and reservations for each nation’s sacred cowW strate how legal transformation can be effected by (or cattle herd, as the case may be). After all, as the WTO
forces other than international trade and investment working groups looking into the impact of e-commerce
regimes. The legal regime underpinning Canada’s pro- on trade rules have noted, technological change can even
tectionist cultural policies provides compelling proof have transformative effects on international treaty obliga-
that there are other ‘‘culprits’’ for the critics of liberalised tions. In other words, I propose that somebody write a
trade to consider. In truth, however, it is far from clear book entitled: ‘‘Technology: the Primary Agent of Legal
that the changes in Canadian cultural policy wrought by Transformation’’. I will be sure to purchase a copy —
technological change are actually a bad thing. As a topic online, of course.
for further research, one might well consider how tech-
nological change has become a force for liberalisation
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